Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

State of Utah v. Shane Doyle : Petition for Writ of
Certiorari
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham, Kenneth A. Bronston; Counsel for Repondent.
Margaret P. Lindsay, Michael E. Jewell; Utah County Public Defenders Association; Counsel for
Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Certiorari, Utah v. Doyle, No. 960294 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/231

This Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court
of Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DOCUMENT

KFU
45.9
S9

BRIEF

DOCKET NO. f 2 M 2 ± £
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No.
Court of Appeals No. 950383-CA

Appellee/Respondent,
vs.

Priority No. 12

SHANE DOYLE,
Appellant/Petitioner.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

This petition for Writ of Certiorari arises out of an appeal
from the Fourth District Judicial Court, Utah County, State of
Utah, before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, from the entry of a
conditional plea of possession of methamphetamine, a second
degree felony, after the denial of Defendant's motion to supress
the evidence.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Fl L

SasTSWP

kxasrjaa

^<m^

JUL 0 9 1B3b

CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

Counsel for Respondent
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766)
MICHAEL E. JEWELL (6254)
Utah County Public Defenders Assoc.
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2570
Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

J
Case No.
Court of Appeals No. 950383-CA

vs.

::
:
J

SHANE DOYLE,

J:

Priority No. 12

Appellee/Respondent,

Appe11ant/Petitioner.

:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

This petition for Writ of Certiorari arises out of an appeal
from the Fourth District Judicial Court, Utah County, State of
Utah, before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, from the entry of a
conditional plea of possession of methamphetamine, a second
degree felony, after the denial of Defendant's motion to supress
the evidence.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Counsel for Respondent
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766)
MICHAEL E. JEWELL (6254)
Utah County Public Defenders Assoc.
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2570
Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABL.K Ol'' AUTHORITIES

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

1
2

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

...... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .

3

STATEMENT OF HL3LEVANT FACTS
r i l x O w f U Z i IN JL

•

POINT I

.3

i

•

«

•

'

•

•

'

•'

•

•

•

•

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPRIETY AND APPROPRIATE
STANDARD OF REVIEW OF "ALL PERSONS PRESENT"
WARRANTS ARE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF LAW WHICH
SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT

O

6

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN
"ALL PERSONS PRESENT" WARRANT . . . . . . . . . 9

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

13

/V*T jT HjViLJ JL A

15

-

•

•

•

-

•

•

-

in

•

•

nii i

Hi

State v. Doyle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (CA 5/23/96) - TAB #1
State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995) - TAB #2
Search Warrant and Supporting Affidavit - TAB #3

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constutional and Statutory Provisions
United States Constitution, Amendment IV

2,6,8,9

Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-201 (1995)

2, 6

Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-203(1) (1995)

2, 6

Cases Cited
State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995) . . 1, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13
State v. Doyle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. 5/23/96) . 1 , 2 ,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338 (1978) . . .

11

7, 8

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent,
vs.

:
s\

Case No.
Court of Appeals No. 950383-CA

SHANE DOYLE,

j\

Priority No. 12

Appellant/Petitioner.

:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in its determinations

concerning the constitutional propriety of "all persons present"
warrants and its appropriate standard of review, when such
determinations are important questions of federal and state law
which should be decided by this Court, and when those
determinations are in direct conflict with the Utah Court of
Appeals' decision in State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App.
1995)?
2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in its determination that

the magistrate, in this case, had a "substantial basis" for
finding there was probable cause for the issuance of an "all
persons present" warrant?
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Dovle,
Case No. 950383, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. 5/23/96) was
filed on May 23, 1996.

A copy of that Opinion is contained in

the Appendix at Tab #1.
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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion in State v.
Dovle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. 1996), on May 23, 1996.
On June 24, 1996, this Court granted Doyle a fifteen day
enlargement of time—up to and including July 9, 1996—within
which to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Therefore,
this petition is timely filed pursuant to Rules 22(a), 48(a) and
(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Furthermore, this

Court has jurisdiction to review this Petition pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) and § 78-2a-4 (1995).

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-201 (1995)
A search warrant is an order issued by a magistrate in the
name of the state and directed to a peace officer,
describing with particularity the thing, place, or person to
be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by him
and brought before the magistrate.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-203(1) (1995)
A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the
person or place to be searched and the person, property, or
evidence to be seized (emphasis added).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant/Petitioner, Shane Doyle, entered a conditional "no
contest" plea to Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug Free
Zone, a second degree felony, in Fourth District Court following
the denial of his motion to suppress (R. 45, 49-58, 67-69).
Doyle then appealed the trial court's denial of his Motion to
Suppress Evidence; and the Utah Court of Appeals' panesl assigned
to this case affirmed the trial court's actions in a decision
dated May 23, 1996. Judge Greenwood, joined by Judge Bench,
delivered the panel's decision; and Judge Orme filed a dissenting
opinion.

Doyle now appeals from the Court of Appeals' decision.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In September and October of 1994, the Provo Police
Department received tips—from an anonymous caller and from a
confidential informant—that Steven and Angela Hundley were using
and selling cocaine; and that Steven Hundley was dealing drugs at
Mountain States Steel, his place of employment (R. 28; 291 Utah
Adv. Rep. 7, 8 ) . On November 7, 1994, Officer Jerry Harper and
other Provo Police officers searched the trash can at 255 North
1600 West, #121 in Provo—the address of Steven and Angela
Hundley—and allegedly found drug paraphernalia with residue,
marijuana debris, baggies, and correspondence to Steven and
Angela Hundley (R. 28; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8).
An Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant (with the
heading "State of Utah, Plaintiff vs. Steven Hundley, Angela
3

Hundley, 255 N. 1600 W., #121 Provo, UT Defendants") containing
the aforementioned information was submitted by Officer Harper to
the Honorable John C. Backlund, Fourth Circuit Court (R. 26-29).
The affidavit requested a no-knock, daytime warrant which
authorized "the search of the mobile home, together with the
curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at
the time of search for presence of controlled substances together
with associated paraphernalia" (R. 26).
Under the same heading, a search warrant was issued by Judge
Backlund on November 8, 1994 (R. 24-25).

The search warrant

authorized a search of the Hundley residence, a mobile-home (R.
24).

In addition, the warrant authorized the "search of any

outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any
individuals present at the time of the execution of this warrant"
(R. 24, 102; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). A copy of the Search
Warrant and its Accompanying Affidavit is included in the
Appendix at Tab #3.
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 11, 1994, officers of
the Provo Police department's Narcotics Enforcement Team executed
the warrant at the Hundley's mobile-home (R. 82-83; 291 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 8). When the officers searched the trailer, the only
persons present were Steve and Angela Hundley and a child (R. 88;
291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). During a search of the trailer, the
police found incriminating evidence against the Hundleys,
collected the evidence, packed it up along with the video camera
4

used to record the search, arrested the Hundleys and took the
child into protective custody (R. 90-91, 114; 291 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 8).
Based on officers' testimony, a white Escort, driven by Teri
Olsen with Doyle as a passenger (R. 92-93), arrived at the
Hundley residence anywhere from 40 to 75 minutes (R. 89, 115)
after the arrival of the police and after the Hundleys had been
arrested and both they and the child had been transported from
the trailer (291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8).
police reported stated:

Officer Denton Johnston's

"At the completion of the search warrant

two other individuals arrived at the home. A Shane Doyle and
Terri Olsen arrived" (R. 90).
Olsen parked her car on the public street across from the
trailer in front of another trailer (R. 89). Doyle exited the
car and entered the trailer (R. 116; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8).
An officer searched Doyle, found paraphernalia on his person, and
placed him under arrest (R. 116; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). The
officers then searched Olsen's vehicle and found three baggies of
methamphetamine (R. 101; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). At that point
the officers interrogated Doyle and he admitted that the drugs
were his (R. 110; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8).
Doyle filed a Motion to Suppress in Fourth District Court
challenging the validity of the "all persons" warrant both on its
face and as applied to Doyle.

Following a suppression hearing,

and pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Doyle plead no
contest to possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a
5

second degree felony (291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8).

Doyle then

appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and
the Court of Appeals affirmed holding:

One, that the issuance of

an "all persons present" warrant was justified; two, that the
correct standard of review regarding probable cause is one of
great defference to the magistrate's decision; and three, that "a
warrant is still being executed so long as the police
legitimately remain on the premises to complete a search and
gather evidence as authorized by that warrant" (291 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 9, 8, 10).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPRIETY AND APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
OF "ALL PERSONS PRESENT" WARRANTS ARE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
OF LAW WHICH SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT
PARTICULARLY WHEN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS
RENDERED CONFLICTING OPINIONS ON THESE ISSUES
In addition to protecting people from unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution indicate's that no warrant shall issue "but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

describing

the place

to be searched,

be seized"

(emphasis added).

and the persons

particularly

or things

Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-23-201,

203 also require that both the warrant and the initial oath or
affirmation providing the probable cause provide a "particular"
description of the persons, places or things to be searched and
the property or evidence to be seized.
6

to

In this case, the authority-granting paragraph in the search
warrant executed here gave officers the right to search the
Hundley's residence and "any outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles,
and the person of any individuals present at the time of the
execution of this warrant" (R. 24, 102). While the Hundley's
residence is described in great detail, neither the warrant nor
the accompanying affidavit, give a particularized description of
the "outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles or persons present" that
are also subject to the search (R. 24-25, 26-29).
Twice in the past nine months, the Utah Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of federal constitutional law:
Whether "general" or "all-persons" warrants—such as the one
executed in this case—are facially unconstitutional and if not,
under what circumstances will such warrants be tolerated.

The

United States Supreme Court aluded to this issue, but did not
decide it, in

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 n. 4, 100

S.Ct. 338, 342 n. 4 (1978):

"[W]e need not consider situations

where the warrant itself authorizes the search of unnamed persons
in a place and is supported by probable cause to believe that
persons who will be in the place at the time of the search will
be in possession of illegal drugs."
In State v. Covington. 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995)1—a
case decided during the pendancy of Dovle, the Utah Court of
Appeals, following the lead of other states, concluded that "all

*A copy of the Opinion in State v. Covington. 904 P.2d 209
(Utah App. 1995), is included in the Appendix at Tab #2.
7

persons present" or "general" warrants are not facially
unconstitutional and that they may be upheld if supported by
probable cause that "all persons in the place at the time of the
search will be involved in the criminal activity upon which the
warrant issued."

Covington. P.2d at 211-212.

However, the Covington court also recognized that "as a
general rule... 'open-ended' or 'general' warrants are
prohibited."

Id. at 211 (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.

85, 92 n.4, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342 n. 4 (1979)).

Accordingly, use of

a "general" or "all persons present" warrant should be the
exception rather than the rule.
In recognition of the exceptional nature of "all persons
present" warrants in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement
of "particularity", the Court of Appeals, in Covington, correctly
"strictly scrutinized" the facts in the affidavit and accordingly
afforded the magistrate little—if any—deference in its
appellate review of the warrant and its accompanying affidavit.
Covington, 904 P.2d at 212-213.
Although the general warrant in Covington was ultimately
affirmed because the court concluded "that the affidavit in this
case establishes probable cause to search all persons present"
(Covington, 904 P.2d at 213), Doyle maintains that the analytical
framework employed by the Court of Appeals in rendering its
decision in Covington is the appropriate one—and is the
framework which should have been employed by the Court of Appeals
in State v. Dovle.
8

Instead, the majority opinion in State v. Dovle, 291 Utah
Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Utah App. 5/23/96), accorded "'great deference to
the magistrate's decision' regarding probable cause."

This

standard of review is in direct contravention to the de novo
review deemed necessary by the Court of Appeals in Covington; and
it effectively—and erroneously—eliminates any meaningful
distinction between the "particularized" warrants required by the
Fourth Amendment and "general" warrants which have been, and
should be, used only in exceptional cases. This is an important
question of law which should be decided by this Court—if only to
eliminate the confusion which has resulted from conflicting
decisions in the Court of Appeals.

POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN
"ALL PERSONS PRESENT" WARRANT
In Dovle. the majority opinion held that the issuance of an
"all persons present" warrant was justified in this case because
"the magistrate had a 'substantial basis' for finding that there
was probable cause to issue an 'all persons' warrant for the
Hundleys' trailer."

Dovle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9.

Doyle

maintains, however, that regardless of the standard of appellate
review employed, and regardless of the deference accorded the
magistrate's decision, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
the issuance of the "all persons present" warrant was supported
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by probable cause to believe that anyone at the Hundley's
residence would be involved in illegal drug activities.
In State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995)f the
Court of Appeals upheld the validity of an "all persons present"
search warrant and affirmed the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress because the underlying affidavit
established probable cause that anyone present at the apartment
would probably be a participant in illegal drug activity.
Doyle asserts that the factual allegations in the affidavit
in this case, unlike that in Covington, are insufficient to
establish probable cause for an "all persons present" search
warrant; and therefore, this Court should grant his Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari in order to correct the Court of Appeals'
error.
The affidavit in Covington indicates that the police
received information from several individuals that drug
trafficking was taking place at a basement apartment located at
479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove:

Rachel Anderson, who was

arrested for possession of methamphetamine on the day the search
warrant was issued told officers that she stole the drugs from
her supplier, Rick Close, who lived in a basement apartment at
479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove.

Covington, 904 P.2d at 213.

Three separate sources had provided officers with tips that Close
had been selling methamphetamine with the past three weeks.

Id.

Finally, NET officers had been receiving tips from numerous
sources that controlled substances were being sold from the 479
10

South 100 East residence for a year prior to the issuance of the
warrant•

Id,

In Doyle's case, however, the only information or "tips"
received by the Provo Police Department were:

One, from an

anonymous caller six weeks before the search warrant issued who
said that Steven and Angela Hundley were using and selling
cocaine; that their address was 255 N. 1600 w. #121, Provo, Utah;
and that Steven Hundley was "dealing heavily" at his place of
employment, Mountain States Steel (R. 28; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at
8).

Two, from a confidential informant who told an officer that

Steven Hundley was selling cocaine I Id.).
In addition, the affidavit in Covington detailed numerous
police observations and activities which supported both the
accuracy of the "tips" they had received as well as probable
cause that all persons present at the apartment were likely to be
involved in drug trafficking.

For example, the officers checked

the criminal histories of both Rachel Anderson and Rick Close and
discovered that they both had a history of controlled substance
violations.

Covington, 904 P.2d at 213.

Officers had also

recently searched Close's vehicle and found drug paraphernalia.
Id. at 25.

In addition, officers had conducted surveillance of

the building at various times during the six months previous to
the warrant's issuance and had arrested people residing in the
building and had found paraphernalia and controlled substances.
Id.

Finally, officers had observed the purchase of narcotics
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from the house by Darcy McDonald, who was subsequently arrested
and charged with a controlled substance violation.

Id.

On the other handf in Doyle's case the officers engaged in
no such surveillance.

There are no facts in the affidavit which

indicate that officers had observed any illegal activities at the
Hundley's residence.

The only related activity prior to the

issuance of the warrant which the officers engaged in was to
seize and search the Hundley's garbage can wherein drug
paraphernalia, marijuana debris, baggies, and a piece of paper
with Steven and Angela Hundley's names and address were found (R.
28; 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8). However, there was no evidence
found by the officers to support the belief of widespread
criminal activity which would justify the issuance of an "all
persons present" warrant.
Moreover, the majority opinion's that the police's discovery
of paraphernalia in the Hundley's trash can "strongly supported
an inference that drugs were being sold from the Hundley's
trailer" (291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9) is simply erroneous.

If such

baggies and other paraphernalia were used by the Hundley's to
conduct a sales operation, they would have been found in the
Hundley's residence and not in the trash can with only trace
amounts of controlled substances.
Judge Orme in his dissenting opinion recognized this truth:
While the search of the trash can, along with the information
received from the confidential informant and the anonymous caller
"established probable cause to search the Hundley's residence, it
12

did not establish the probability that other person coming to the
residence were most likely intending to engage in drug
transactions,"

291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10 (dissent).

Furthermore, all of the cases cited to by the Court of
Appeals in Covington in which "all persons present" warrants were
validly issued, can be distinguished from Doyle's case.

In each

of these cases the affidavits in support of the "all persons
present" warrant contained corroborated information of widespread illegal conduct from knowledgeable sources in addition to
substantial police observation and surveillance of extensive
illegal activities.

See also,

Doyle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10

(dissent).
In Doyle, there was no surveillance from police and the only
information came from one anonymous caller and a confidential
informant, who indicated only that drugs were being sold at Steve
Hundley's place of employment—not his home. As Judge Orme noted
in dissent, "Without more evidence of drug dealing from the home,
there is nothing to establish a link between the home, the
alleged drug dealing, and any person, other than the Hundleys,
who may have been present."

Doyle, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10.

Accordingly, Doyle asks that this Court grant his Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari so that the Court of Appeals' erroneous
finding of "probable cause" for the issuance of an "all persons"
warrant can be corrected.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the aforementioned "special and important" reasons,
Doyle respectfully asks that this Court grant his Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari and review the issues addressed herein,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

"/

day of July, 1996.

Margarets/Lindsay
Counsel for Doyle
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true
and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari
this

7

day of July, 1996, to the following:

Kenneth A.

Bronston, Assistant Attorney General, Jan Graham, Utah Attorney
General, Heber Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor,
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114.

Wfastf* J&WZ h/^r.
£^7
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State ?. Doyle

Provo. VtMh

291 Utah Adv. nip 7

giving him the benefit of the amended statute.
button control the instant case.
Notwithstanding this supreme court precedent, Nevertheless, we are bound by existing supreme
the State warns against manipulative defendants court case law. State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 3 9 3 ,
who might obtain more favorable sentences by
399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (stating .vertical stare
disregarding court orders to appear for decisis requires lower court to strictly follow
sentencing. The State's concern is misplaced htghTTcblirt's prior ruling), cert, denied^ 115 S.
given the underlying principles of the rule. Utah
CrT9TTrn995):
~~
;ourts respect the "'legislative judgment that the
I therefore concur only in the result.
lesser penalty
is sufficient to meet the
Russell W. Bench. Judge
legitimate ends of the cnminal law.'" Belt, 479
P.2d at 793 (quoting Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at
201-02). Moreover, "'(nlothing is to be gamed
1. The State claims the actual value of the stolen
by imposing the more severe penalty after (the "property is SI234 Coumier's insurance company,
legislature has acted], the excess in punishment however, valued the property at Si 150 The insurance
company paid Coumier S900. the sum owed her after
:an, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than
to satisfy a desire for vengeance.'" Id. (quoting her $250 deductible The triaJ court subsequently
imposed restitution of the $250 deductible.
Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 201-02). Dilatory as well
The State also introduces an argument grounded in
as dilinent defendants are entitled to the benefit
comract theory for the first time on appeal. The State
of the legt^lafflre^amgndffd piinj<ihments~ina contends because it bargained for Yates's plea to class
Jesaex-aentejnces.
A theft, resentencing Yates pursuant to the amended
We are bound by the Utah Supreme Court's penalty deprives it of the benefit of its bargain. If we
determination of the precise issue before us were persuaded this interesting theory compelled a
now. Accordingly, Yates's conduct subsequent different result here, we could address it because
to his guilty plea is immaterial to his sentence; appellate courts may affirm on any proper ground. See
the trial court should not have considered that Hebry v Noble. W9""Md 42&T444 (Utah 1995).
Yates was substantially responsible for the However, we are unpersuaded and unable to rule
definitively on the argument inasmuch as the State has
sentencing delay.
not cited any helpful authority. Accordingly, we do
not consider the State's contract argument.
CONCLUSION
The trial court incorrectly sentenced Yates
pursuant to the statute in effect at the time he
committed
his
offense.
Under
criminal
Cite M
classifications in effect when Yates was
291 Utah Adv. Rep. 7
sentenced, theft of property valued less than
$300 constitutes a class B misdemeanor
IN THE
punishable by a prison term not exceeding six
UTAH
COURT
OF APPEALS
months. Accordingly, we reverse the trial
court's ruling and remand for a new sentence
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (Supp. STATE of Utah,
1995).
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
v,
I CONCUR:
Shane DOYLE,
James Z . Davis, Associate Presiding Judge

Defendant and Appellant.

B E N C H , J u d g e (concurring in result):
_l_agree thal^ under controlling supreme court
case laWj_Yates should be resentenced to a class
B misdemeanor. See State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 2d
456, 459-60, 519 P.2d 1340, 1342 (1974); State
v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 394-95, 490 P.2d
334, 336; Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230.
232-33, 479 P.2d 7 9 1 , 792-93 aff\l on reh $, 25
Utah 2d 380, 381-82, 483 P.2d 4 2 5 , 426
(1971). I am concerned, however, about sending
the wrong message to those who have violated
the law.
If Yates had presented himself for sentencing
when ordered by the court, he properly would
have been sentenced to a class A misdemeanor.
Rather than appearing in a timely fashion,
however, Yates became a fugitive from justice.
it cook a bench warrant and a subsequent arrest
fw get him to appear for sentencing. Meanwhile,
the legislature had amended the relevant statute.
It seems to me unwise and shortsighted to
reward Yates for his flight from justice by

No. 950383-CA
FILED: May 23, 1996
Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Boyd L. Park

ATTORNEYS:
Margaret P.
Provo, for
Jan Graham
Lake City,

Lindsay and Michael Jewell,
Appellant
and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt
for Appellee

Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Greenwood.
H i t s opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific R e p o r t e r .
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Shane Doyle appeals the trial court \s refusal to
suppress evidence obtained during the execution
of an /*all persons present") search warrant.
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291 Utah Adv. Rep. 7

contending that the warrant wa* unconstitutional
both as issued and as executed. We affirm.
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present" at the Hundleys' tnuler?
(2) Did the search of Doyle exceed the scope
of the warrant?

BACKGROUND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
On November 8, 1994, the Provo City Police
_We "accord great deference to the magistrate's
obtained a warrant authorizing them to search
the mobile home trailer of Steven and Angela I decision" regardim* probable cause. Salt Lake
Hundley, located at 255 North 1600 West, f Oiy'v. Trujillo, 854 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah App.
number 121, in Provo, Utah. This warrant also 1993). yifijwjlLinvmlidate^ scarehj)ursuantjp_a^
authorized the search of "any outbuildings, warrant "only if the magistrate, given the totality
curtilage, vehicles and the person of any of the circumstances, lacked a 'substantial basis'
individuals present at the time of the execution for determining that probable cause existed." Id.
of this warrant.'* (emphasis added). The affidavit * (quotingState v. Thurman% 846 P.2d 1256, 1260
in support of the warrant stated the search was (Utah 1993)).
appropriate based upon the following
information:
ANALYSIS
(1) a tip from an anonymous caller stating
Constitutionality of the "All Persons
that both Steven and Angela Hundley were
Present" Warrant
using and selling cocaine and that Steven
Doyle urges us to conclude that warrants
Hundley was "dealing heavily" from his I authorizing the search of "all persons present" at
place of employment;
a particular location are facially unconstitutional
(2) corroboration by a reliable police
because they violate the particularity requirement
informant that Steven Hundley was dealing
of both the United States and Utah
cocaine, and
Constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. [V; Utah
Const, art. I, §14J However, during the
(3) independent corroboration by the
Provo Police through a search of the
pendency of this appeal, this court issued State
Hundleys' trash receptacle which yielded
v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995).
both drug paraphernalia coated with trace
In Covington, this court determined that a
amounts of drug residue and items such as
warrant" authorizing the search of "all persons
baggies and marijuana debris which
present" does not violate the Fourth Amendment
potentially indicated the existence of a retail
if it is based upon "probable cause to believe
drug sales operation.
that any person found [at the location in
On November 11, 1994, at approximately question] would be involved in narcotics
5:00 p.m., officers of the Provo Police trafficking." Id. at 212. Thus, it is no longer.AH
Department's Narcotics Enforcement Team open question whether "ail persons" warrants
executed the warrant. When the officers arrived are categorically valid; the only remaining
at the trailer, the only persons present were questions are whether this particular warrant was
Steven and Angela Hundley and a child. Upon supported by sufficient probable cause and
searching the trailer, the police found evidence whether it was valid as executed.
incriminating both the Hundleys and placed them
under arrest. The child was taken into protective
Probable Cause
custody.
In Covington, this court referred to what has
Forty to seventy-five minutes after the police come to be known as the "nexus" requirement
had arrived and after the Hundleys had been for the issuance of an "all persons present"
arrested and both they and the child has been search warrant. State v. Covington, 904 P.2d
transported from the scene, a white Ford Escort, 209, 211 (Utah App. 1995). The nexus test
driven by Ten Olsen with Doyle as passenger, derives from the opinion of Chief Justice
drove up and parked near the Hundleys' trailer. Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Doyle exited the car and entered the trailer. The State v. De Simone, 288 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1972).
officers
searched
Doyle,
found drug In De Simone, the court found that j^anantsparaphernalia on his person, and placed him authorizing the search_ofJlalLpex9ons present"
under arrest. The officers then proceeded to pass constitutional musterjf they are supported
search Olsen's car and found three baggies [ oy"proba6J£cause to believe jhat anyone present
containing methamphetamines which, upon "at the location will likefy be involved in the_
interrogation. Doyle admitted belonged to him.
suspected criminal activity. The court reasoned
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Doyle pleaded as follows:
no contest to a charge of possession of
|W]uh regard to the Fourth Amendment
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second
demand for specificity as to the subject to be
degree felony, conditional upon his right to
searched, there is none of the vice of a
appeal the trial court's denial of,hjs motion to
general warrant if the individual is thus
suppress. See generally State £ Sery, 758 P.2d
.identified by phxsicaL nexus to the ongoing^
<US. *)H40(Utah App. l<?88). ~
criminal event iLself. In such a setting, the
officer executing the warrant has neither the
ISSl'ES ON APPEAL
Authority nor tho opportunity to search
(\) WHS there probable cause to issue a
everywhere for anyone violating a law. So
warrant authorizing che search o( "all persons
long as there is good reason to suspect or _
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believe that anyone present at the anticipated
scene will probably be a participant,
presence becomes the descriptive fact
satisfying the aim of the Fourth Amendment.
The evil of the general warrant is thereby
negated. To insist nonetheless that the
individual be otherwise described when
circumstances will not permit it, would
simply deny government a needed power to
deal with crime, without advancing the
interest the Amendment was meant to serve.
id. at 850-51 (emphasis added). The nexus
requirement has been employed by courts with
varying results. E.g., People v. Johnson, 805
P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101,
105-06 (Mass.), cert, denied sub nom., Smith v.
Massachusetts, 429 U.S. 944, 97 S. Ct. 364
(1976); State v. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d 57,
60-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Hinkel,
353 N.W.2d 617, 620-21 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984), rev d on other grounds, 365 N.W.2d 774
(Minn. 1985); State v. Sims, 382 A.2d 638,
643-44 (N.J. 1978); State ex reL L.Q., 566
A.2d 223, 226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1989),
cert, denied, 584 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1990);
Covington, 904 P.2d at 211-13; Morton v.
Commonwealth, 434 S.E.2d 890, 892-93 (Va.
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Carter, 901 P.2d 335,
339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); see also 2 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search & Seizure §4.5(e), 546 (3d
ed. 1996) ("Unquestionably, the De Simone
rationale is correct.").
_The Covington opinion also refers to three
jrelevant factorsTdelififfea by thTMassachusetfs
Supre.me.Court in S/w//rr348 f^E7ZcTat~i07, as
apj)rjopriAte_ia__determining whether probabje
cause exists for an * all pcTJOJQS". warrant.,
Cdvfngion^M P.2d~aT2T2. the Smith court
stated:
JS[evera! facts are of particular relevance:
the premises or area to be searched are
small, confined and private; the nature of
the criminal activity is such that the
participants (in general) constantly shift or
change so that it is, practically, impossible
for the police to predict that any specific
person or persons will be on the premises at
any given time; and the items specifically
described in the warrant as the target of the
search are of a size or kind which renders
^them easily and likely to be concealed on
the person.
Smith, 348 N.E.2d at 107 (footnote omitted).
Each of these factors is present in this case.
The Hundleys' trailer is a "small, confined and
private" dwelling. This factor is important
because an "all persons" search of such a
dwelling is far less likely to entrap the innocent
than one of a public or semi-public
establishment Sec. e.g., Yharru v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 97, 100 S. Ct. 3J8, US (1979) j
(holding warrant to search bar did not allow
search of patron). With respect to the second
and third factors, the nature of drug dealing is

unknown persons, while the subject of the
learch, drugs, are usually easily hidden or
disposed. Accordingly, _ a_sjnklL_priYlUe
I residence^ such as the Hundley trailer, may be
a'permissjble locale for an^all persons" search
warrant, when drug dealing is alleged, if the
requisite, degree of probable cause..can be.
shown;
Having determined that the situation in
question potentially warranted the issuance of an
"all persons" warrant, we must now examine the
affidavit submitted in support of the "all
persons" warrant to determine if it provided the
requisite degree of probable cause. We believe
the affidavit in this case supports a reasonable
inference that the Hundleys were conducting a
retail drug sales operation from their residence
such as would justify the issuance of a warrant
to search all persons who might be present
therein. The affidavit was based upon three
primary factors: First, an anonymous tip that the
Hundleys were using and selling drugs and that
Steven Hundley was "dealing heavily" from his
workplace; second, a reliable police informant's
confirmation that Steven Hundley was selling
drugs; and third, the results of the police search
of the Hundleys' trash receptacle.
While the anonymous tip, in and of itself, may
not provide a sufficient basis for the issuance of
the warrant, the police took substantial steps to
corroborate it through a second confidential
informant and through their own independent
investigation. The confidential informant's
corroboration was deemed to be reliable because
this m form ant had provided the police with
reliable information in the past. More
importantly, the police search of the Hundleys*
trash uncovered evidence which strongly
supported an inference that drugs were being
sold from the Hundleys* trailer. In the
Hundleys' trash, the police found drug
paraphernalia,
trace
amounts
of
methamphetamines, marijuana debris, butane
fuel canisters, syringes and baggies.
This evidence was interpreted for the
magistrate by the affiant, Officer Jerry Harper.
Officer Harper expressed his belief, based upon
his substantial experience in drug enforcement,
that this evidence established the likelihood that
controlled substances would be found in the
Hundley residence. He also stated his belief that
a no-knock "all persons" warrant was necessary
due to the fact that, by their very nature, drugs
are easily susceptible to being hidden or
destroyed.
Having reviewed the information in the
affidavit, we conclude that the magistrate had a
"substantial basis" for finding that there was
probable cause to issUv? an "all persons" warrant
for the Hundleys' trailer. The information
contained in the affidavit supports a reasonable
inference of an on-going criminal enterprise
operated out of the Hundleys* trailer. Such an
mference provides the requisjte ne_xus_Jo
cninmaiactivity to justifyjhejsjuiaiice of anlall
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Execution of the Warrant
Doyle next asserts that even if we find that the
warrant was based upon probable cause, it did
not permit a search of his person because the
warrant had been executed before he arrived.
Doyle argues that even if the warrant did permit
a search of persons present or arriving shortly
after the police began their search, it did not
permit a search of Doyle because when he
arrived, the police had completed their search
and thus were no longer executing the warrant.
We begin by examining the language of the
warrant. The warrant authorized the search of
"any individuals present at the time of the
execution of the warrant." This language is
susceptible to two different interpretations. The
time of execution could be limited to the exact
time the police serve the warrant, or it could be
the entire time the police are legitimately on the
premises under the authority of the warrant. We
believe the latter is a more reasonable
interpretation.
The clear intent behind a warrant to search
"all persons present" is to allow a search of any
persons, who by their mere presence, are
potentially implicated in the criminal activity in
question. The nexus between a person's
presence and his or her relation to criminal
activity does not change simpty because of the
passage of a short period of time. Therefocc^an
"alljpecsons present" warrant applies equally to
all persons who^are present within a reasonable
time_ after_ the executioa_of the .warrant,
including those who _ arrive _on thc_ premises
while the police are still legitimately present.
Furthermore, we believe the nexus requirement
already provides sufficient protection against
police overreaching. See Commonwealth v.
Graciani, 554 A.2d 560, 562-63 (Pa. 1989).
Accordingly, we hold that the warrant
authorized the search of Doyle despite the fact
that he arrived on the scene during the execution
of the search warrant. See id. at 562 ("'We
cannot sanction any rule that through fraud and
gamesmanship erects barriers to the effective
and legitimate execution of search warrants.")
(quoting Commonwealth v. Reece, 549 A.2d
909, 911 (Pa. 1988)).
The last argument we address is whether the
police had completed their execution of the
warrant when Doyle arrived. Although the
Hundleys and the child had already been
transported, that does not necessarily mean the
officers were no longer entitled to remain on the
premises for a reasonable period in order to
complete their investigation. Apparently, the
officers were completing the gathering of
evidence when Doyle arrived at the Hundley
trailer. Doyle has not asserted that they were no
longer authonzed to be on the premises nor that
they were intentionally loitering in hopes of
snaring other suspects. Accordingly, we concur
m the trial court's analysis of this issua-and hold
that a warrant is still being executed so long as
the police legitimately remain on the premises to
complete a search and gathering of evidence as

authonzed by that warrant.
CONCLUSION
Covington establishes that warrants to search
"all persons present1* at a given location are
permissible if supported by probable cause to
believe that anyone present is likely to be
involved in the cnminal activity m question.
Because the affidavit at issue in this case
provided the magistrate with sufficient evidence
to infer the requisite degree of probable cause,
the warrant was valid and authonzed a search of
any person who was present at the Hundleys'
trailer. Furthermore, despite the fact that Doyle
arrived after the police had begun their search,
he was still a "person present" for purposes of
the wan-ant's language. Finally, because the
police were still in the process of executing the
warrant when Doyle arrived, they were justified
in searching his person. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm the trial court's refusal to
suppress the evidence.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
I CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
ORME, Presiding Judge (dissenting):
I dissent. While the affidavit established
probabte cause to search the Hundleys*
residence, it did not establish the probability that
other persons coming to the residence were most
likely intending to engage in drug transactions.
Quite the contrary, the affidavit identified Steve
Hundley's place of employment, rather than the
residence, as the hotbed of sale activity. While
I take no issue with the general law outlined by
the majority, I fail to see how the affidavit
established, in the words of the main opinion,
"probable cause to believe that anyone present at
the location will likely be involved in the
suspected criminal activity." While I concede the
three factors delineated in Commonwealth v.
Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101, 107 (Mass. 1976), seem
to be present in this case, as duly noted by the
majority, this is merely a threshold question and
not dispositive of whether the "all persons
present" warrant was adequately supported by
probable cause.
In reviewing the grant of an "all persons
present" warrant, this court must carefully
scrutinize the underlying affidavit. State v.
Covington, 904 P.2d 209, 212 (Utah App.
1995). In Covington, this court cited to cases in
which "all persons present" searches were
upheld. Id. In each of these cases, the facts had
to establish a sufficient nexus between the
criminal activity, the place of the activity, and
the persons at the place. Id. The facts that
helped establish this nexus are, for example, an
informant observing large quantities of cocaine
in the house, drugs being sold from the house,
numerous persons entering the premises and
staying for short periods of time, a lookout
present to wani occupants of police activity,
undercover purchases of crack cocaine from the
residence, and extensive walk-in and drive-in
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traffic at the location. Id. We have no such
information here. Given the affidavit before us,
it ts just as likely that the only visitors to the
Hundley residence were friends, relatives, pizza
deli very men, opinion surveyors, bill collectors.
Jehovah f s Witnesses, and persons looking for
lost pets as it is that most visitors were looking
to buy drugs. A fair reading of the affidavit is
that those looking to buy drugs from the
Hundleys called on Steven at work rather than
dropping by the residence.
In this case, there is nothing in the affidavit
quoted by the majority to establish the requisite
factual nexus. The only premises from which
drug sales took place, according to the explicit
language of the affidavit, was Steven Hundley's
place of employment. There was no indication
that numerous persons dropped by for short
periods of time or even that an undercover drug
purchase was made from the home. Without
more evidence of drug dealing from the home,
there is nothing to establish a link between the
home, the alleged drug dealing, and any person,
other than the Hundleys, who may have been
present. Therefore, insofar as directed at anyone
else who might turn up at the residence, the
warrant was not supported by probable cause,
and the search of defendant was unlawful.
I would reverse the conviction and remand for
a new trial.
Gregory K. Orme, Presiding Judge

1. Doyle urges us to adopt a reading of our state
—constitution which is more expansive than the analysis
employed under the federal constitution. The "proper
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing
anaJysis of state constitutional interpretation is before
the trial court, not, as typically happens . . . for the
first time on appeal." State v. Bobo% 803 P.2d 1268,
1273 (Utah App. 1990). Because the trial court was
pot afforded a meaningful opportunity "to address Che
state constitutional issue."W^Tdgcline to ^onduct a
separate statexonstmitional ana]y_sjs_aaappeal.

^UmiIlI»IUIl
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Daniel F. HARMON, Michael G. Bick, and
Mary A. Folkman,
Petitioners,
v.
SERVICE
OGDEN
CITY C I V I L
COMMISSION,
Respondent.
No. 950152
FILED: May 24, 1996
Original Proceeding in the Court of Appeals
ATTORNEYS:
Erik Stnndberg, Ralph E. Chamness, Salt
Lake City, for petitioners
Stanley J. Preston, Richard A. Van Wagoner,
Salt Lake City, and Frederick Froerer, HI,
Ogden, for respondent
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
DURHAM, Justice:
Daniel F. Harmon, Michael G. Bick, and
Mary A. Folkman petitioned for review of a
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in
Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service
Commission, 890 P.2d 4 (Ct. App.), cert,
granted, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995), holding
that the Ogden City Civil Service Commission
(Commission) did not have jurisdiction to hear
appeals regarding pay scale step classifications
and annual review timetables. Upon reviewing
the court of appeals* opinion, the briefs to this
court, and the presentations made at oral
argument, we find ourselves in substantial
agreement with the court of appeals* opinion and
affirm on the grounds stated therein.
Petitioners Harmon and Bick are members of
the Ogden City Fire Department. Both were
promoted to the position of fire captain-Harmon
in March of 1991 and Bick in May of 1992-and
placed at step four on the city pay scale.
Sometime between the two promotions, a third
employee was also promoted to the position of
fire captain, but because of his paramedic
training, he was placed at step seven of the pay
scale. Harmon and Bick filed grievances
(Harmon filed one and Bick filed two)
contending that paramedic training should not
warrant higher compensation.1 Their department
head denied their requests for relief, and they
appealed to the Commission. Following a
hearing, the Commission entered an order
dismissing the appeals, ruling that it did not
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904 P.2d 209, State v. Covington, (Utah App. 1995)
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Stacey A. COVINGTON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 940716-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept. 28, 1995.
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth District
Court, Utah County, Lynn W. Davis, J., of drugrelated offenses. Defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, J., held, as matter of first
impression, that affidavit established probable cause
to search all persons present at basement apartment
used for drug trafficking.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES kl24
349 —
349II Warrants
349k 123
Form and Contents of Warrant;
Signature
349k 124
Particularity or generality and
overbreadth in general.

Utah App. 1995.
Generally, "open-ended" or "general" warrants
are constitutionally prohibited.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
2.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES kl26
349
349II Warrants
349kl23
Form and Contents of Warrant;
Signature
349kl26
Places, objects, or persons to be
searched.

Utah App. 1995.
Warrant to search designated premises does not
authorize search of every individual who happens to
be on the premises. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
J.

138k 188(6)

Reliability; corroboration.

Utah App. 1995.
Affidavit established probable cause to search all
persons present at basement apartment linked with
drug trafficking; affidavit linked the apartment with
drug trafficking through testimony of reliable
informant and police observation, residence was
occupied by several adults with criminal narcotics
histories, all persons on premises would likely have
relevant evidence on their persons, and small bindles
of drugs could readily be hidden on person or
destroyed once intent to search was revealed.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Shelden R. Carter, Carter, Phillips & Wilkinson,
Provo, for Appellant.

Affirmed.
/.

Pagel

DRUGS AND NARCOTICS kl88(6)
138
138II Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
13811(D) Searches and Seizures
138k 186
Search Under Warrant
138kl88
Affidavits, Complaints, and
Evidence for Issuance of Warrants
138k 188(4)
Informants

Todd A. Utzinger, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Jan
Graham, State Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.
Before ORME, BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Stacey A. Covington appeals from the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress
evidence used to convict him of drug-related
offenses. Having determined that "[t]he facts and
legal arguments are adequately presented in the
briefs and record and the decisional process would
not be significantly aided by oral argument," Utah
R.App.P. 29(a)(3), we affirm.
•210
FACTS
On February 22, 1994, Rachel Anderson was
arrested by officers of the Pleasant Grove Police
Department. At the time of her arrest, officers
discovered methamphetamine concealed in her
clothing. Anderson later told one of the officers that
she had stolen the drug from Rick Close, who had
additional quantities of methamphetamine in bindles
at his apartment, ready for sale. She said that Close
had been supplying her with methamphetamine and
that she had been smoking methamphetamine with
him that day. She also stated that Close was living
with Melissa Seamster and John Walker in the
basement apartment of a house located at 479 South
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100 East.
The officers were familiar with Mr. Close, who
had a history of involvement with controlled
substances. Prior to Anderson's arrest, the officers
had received tips that Close had been selling
methamphetamine and had searched Close's vehicle
and found drug paraphernalia.
Moreover, the
officers were familiar with the house Anderson
described, having arrested people residing in it.
Based upon this information, the officers obtained
a search warrant. The warrant authorized them to
search "[t]he downstairs apartment and the person of
all individuals present at 479 South 100 East,
Pleasant Grove" for "narcotics and other evidence of
trafficking!,] including but not limited to cash,
weapons, baggies, scales, buy-owe sheets and
paraphernalia for the use, storage, sale or
preparation of narcotics."
The officers arrived at Close's apartment to
execute the warrant at 8:40 p.m. on February 22,
1994. The door leading to the apartment was
located on the north side of a covered porch that
protruded from the southeast corner of the rear of
the house. A truck with its hood up was parked to
the north of Close's door, approximately eight to ten
feet away. Defendant stood between the truck and
the door. The first officers to arrive at the door
encountered defendant. One of them took custody
of him, while the others proceeded into the
apartment.
The officer who took custody of defendant
ordered him to lie down on the ground, with his
hands and legs spread. The officer then frisked
defendant, and felt a hard, cylindrical object in his
shirt pocket, as well as what he believed to be a
cigarette package. The officer testified that the hard
object "was small, like a pinky size, cylindrical in
nature and had the curvature around the mouth piece
and things of that nature that I felt indicated to meor made me feel it was a marijuana pipe."
The officer did not immediately remove either
object from defendant's shirt, but instead waited
until the apartment had been secured. He then took
defendant inside the apartment and stood him next to
the other suspects.
At that point, the officer
searched defendant's person and removed a

marijuana pipe and cigarette package from
defendant's shirt pocket.
Upon inspecting the
cigarette package, which contained marijuana, the
officer arrested defendant for possession of drug
paraphernalia and possession of marijuana. At the
Pleasant Grove Police Department, officers
conducted an extensive search of defendant and
found a small quantity of methamphetamine in the
change pocket of his jeans. A larger quantity was
also found near the truck where defendant had first
been observed.
Defendant was charged with possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drugfree zone, a second-degree felony, Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1994); possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) in a drug-free zone,
a class A misdemeanor,_ii. Sec. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i);
noncompliance with the illegal drug stamp tax act, a
third-degree felony,J$L Sec. 59-19-103(1)Q>)\ and
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free
zone, a class A misdemeanor, j$L Sec. 58-37a-5(l).
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the
drugs and marijuana pipe. After an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
Defendant then pled guilty to the first two charges,
conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress._Sfi£ State v. Sery,
758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). Defendant
now challenges the trial court's ruling as violative of
the Fourth Amendment.
•211
"ALL PERSONS PRESENT" SEARCH
WARRANT
[1][2] The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution directs that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause ... and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S. Const, amend. IV.
As a general rule, therefore, " 'open-ended' or
'general' warrants are constitutionally prohibited."
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 n. 4, 100 S.Ct.
338, 342 n. 4, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979).
Additionally, it is clear that a warrant to search
designated premises does not authorize the search of
every individual who happens to be on the premises.
Id. "Because the standard of probable cause must be
particularized to every person or place to be
searched, a warrant authorizing the search of
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premises does not authorize officers to search an
individual merely because that person is present on
the premises." State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111

anticipated scene will probably be a participant,
presence becomes the descriptive fact satisfying
the aim of the Fourth Amendment.

(Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah
1989).

Id.,288A.2dat850.

The question remains whether a warrant that
authorizes the search of unnamed persons present at
a location is lawful if it is supported by probable
cause to believe that all persons in the place at the
time of the search will be involved in the criminal
activity upon which the warrant issued. This issue
is one of first impression in Utah.
The majority of courts that have addressed the
validity of "all persons present" search warrants
have held that, depending on the evidence supporting
the probable cause for their issuance, they may pass
constitutional muster. (FN1) In State v. De Simone,
60 N.J. 319, 288 A.2d 849 (1972), the New Jersey
Supreme Court set forth the following rationale for
upholding such a warrant:
On principle, the sufficiency of a warrant to
search persons identified only by their presence at
a specified place should depend upon the facts. A
showing that lottery slips are sold in a department
store or an industrial plant obviously would not
justify a warrant to search every person on the
premises, for there would be no probable cause to
believe that everyone there was participating in
the illegal operation. On the other hand, a
showing that a dice game is operated in a manhole
or in a barn should suffice, for the reason that the
place is so limited and the illegal operation so
overt that it is likely that everyone present is a
party to the offense. Such a setting furnishes not
only probable cause but also a designation of the
persons to be searched which functionally is as
precise as a dimensional portrait of them.
... [W]ith regard to the Fourth Amendment
demand for specificity as to the subject to be
searched, there is none of the vice of a general
warrant if the individual is thus identified by
physical nexus to the ongoing criminal event
itself. In such a setting, the officer executing the
warrant has neither the authority nor the
opportunity to search everywhere for anyone
violating a law. So long as there is good reason
to suspect or believe that anyone present at the

In Commonwealth v. Smith, 370 Mass. 335, 348
N.E.2d 101. cert, denied. 429 U.S. *212 944,97
S.Ct. 364, 50 L.Ed.2d 314 (1976), the
Massachusetts Supreme Court applied similar
reasoning to uphold a warrant commanding the
police to search an apartment and the person of one
Jane Doe and any person present. Id., 348 N.E.2d
at 102. The court emphasized that an affidavit in
support of a warrant seeking to authorize a search of
any person present must be strictly scrutinized. The
court elucidated three factors it deemed of particular
relevance in reviewing the affidavits:
[1] the premises or area to be searched are small,
confined and private [as opposed to a public or
quasi-public place where casual presence of
persons for myriad of noncriminal reasons is to be
expected]; [2] the nature of the criminal activity
is such that the participants (in general) constantly
shift or change so that it is, practically, impossible
for the police to predict that any specific person
or persons will be on the premises at any given
time; and [3] the items specifically described in
the warrant as the target of the search are of a
size or kind which renders them easily and likely
to be concealed on the person.
Id., 348 N.E.2d at 107 (footnote omitted).
The court in Smith concluded that the affidavit
supporting the search warrant at issue in that case
provided "probable cause to believe that any person
present on the premises described in the search
warrant was involved in illegal trafficking in
heroin." Id. at 103.
The affidavit relied upon
information received from an informant who had
been inside the apartment named in the warrant and
had seen, on two occasions, the person named in the
warrant selling heroin to other persons present in the
apartment. Id. at 106. The affidavit also indicated
that police surveillance of the apartment had
revealed persons known to traffic in heroin enter and
leave the apartment. Id.
Several subsequent drug trafficking cases have
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upheld search warrants upon facts establishing a
sufficient nexus between the criminal activity, the
place of the activity, and the persons at the place.
In Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 369 Pa.Super.
398, 535 A.2d 611 (1987), the court upheld a search
warrant authorizing the search of all persons present
at a home in which a confidential and reliable
informant had, immediately preceding the issuance
of the warrant, observed the owner selling cocaine
to other persons at the house. The informant had
also observed large quantities of cocaine in the
house available for sale. Additional informants also
corroborated that drugs were being sold from the
house. Id.,535 A.2dat615.
In State ex rel. L.Q., 236 N.J.Super. 464, 566
A.2d 223 (19891. cert, denied. 122 N.J. 121, 584
A.2d 199 (1990), the court upheld an all persons
present warrant supported by the report of a reliable
source that ongoing cocaine sales were taking place
at the specified location; police surveillance that
revealed numerous persons entering the premises,
staying for short periods of time, and then leaving
the house; and the observation of a lookout person
to warn the occupants of police activity in the
neighborhood. Id., 566 A.2d at 226.
Finally, in People v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 1156
(Colo.Ct.App. 1990), the court upheld an all persons
present warrant obtained on the strength of tips from
at least nine confidential sources that crack cocaine
was being sold from the residence;
police
surveillance and observation of extensive walk-in
and drive-in traffic at the location; and several
undercover purchases of crack cocaine from the
residence. Id. at 1158, 1161: accord State v.
Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Minn. 1985);
Morton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 946, 434
S.E.2d 890, 892-93 (1993).
[3] In the present case, the officers' authority to
search defendant arose out of the search warrant's
direction to search N[t]he downstairs apartment and
the person of all individuals present at 479 South
100 East." In light of the foregoing, the precise
issue before us is whether, based on the affidavit
upon which the search warrant issued, the
authorities had probable cause to believe that any
person found at the basement apartment would be
involved in narcotics trafficking. (FN2)

The affidavit upon which the search warrant
issued provides, in relevant part:
•213. 4. After her arrest I interviewed Anderson
further. She stated that she had stolen the drugs
several hours before ... from Rick Close's tool box
and that he had additional quantities of
methamphetamine in bindles, ready for sale.... She
stated that Close lives in a house at 479 South 100
East in die basement apartment which is entered in
the rear. She stated that Close has been supplying
her with amphetamine and that she has been
smoking meth with Close today. Anderson stated
that Close was living with Melissa Seamster and
John Walker.

6. Anderson has a substantial criminal history
including longtime involvement with controlled
substances. Her history includes possession of
amphetamines, prescription fraud, and uttering
forged prescriptions.
NET officers have
purchased drugs from Anderson and have arrested
Anderson in possession of controlled substances
on other occasions.
7. Officers have verified from personal
observation that Rick Close resides at 479 South
100 East, Pleasant Grove. The building is a white
frame building containing two apartments. One is
on the main or ground level and the other is a
basement apartment entered from the rear on the
east side.
8. Rick Close has a substantial history of
involvement with controlled substances. Officers
have received tips from at least three separate
sources that Close has been selling
methamphetamine within the past three weeks.
Officers recently searched the vehicle of Close
and found drug paraphernalia.
There are
presently two active warrants for the arrest of
Rick Close from the Orem Department of the
Fourth Circuit Court with bail in the amount of
$470 and the Justice Court for Pleasant Grove
City with bail in the amount of $2,000, cash only.

12. NET officers have been receiving tips
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regarding this residence from numerous sources
during the past year. The information consistently
indicates that controlled substances are being sold
from that location.
Officers have conducted
surveillance at various times during the past six
months and have arrested people residing in the
building and found drug paraphernalia and
controlled substances including methamphetamine.
Officers observed a purchase of narcotics from
the house by Darcy McDonald on 6-30-93.
McDonald was subsequently arrested and charged
with a narcotics related offense.
13. It is my experience that persons who deal
in small bindles of methamphetamine will have, in
their possession or at their residence, narcotics
and other evidence of trafficking including but not
limited to cash, weapons, baggies, scales, buyowe sheets and paraphernalia for the use, storage,
sale or preparation of narcotics. Such persons
will typically sell what they have as quickly as
they can until they are out of inventory at which
time they will attempt to "re-up" or purchase a
large quantity to be divided into smaller bindles
for sale.

15. It is also my experience that when drugs
are being used and sold in a residence occupied by
several adults, all of whom have criminal histories
and experience with narcotics[,] that all persons
on the premises will likely have relevant evidence
on their persons or in their possession.
Moreover, small bindles of drugs as expected in
this matter can be readily hidden on a person or
destroyed once the intent to search is revealed.
We conclude that the affidavit in this case
establishes probable cause to search all persons
present at the basement apartment. We therefore

affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
to suppress and affirm his conviction.
ORME, P.J., and BENCH, J., concur.
FNL In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct.
338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether the police could
search a person based on his presence at a tavern
they had a warrant to search. Without considering
"situations where the warrant itself authorizes the
search of unnamed persons in a place and is
supported by probable cause to believe that persons
who will be in the place at the time of the search
will be in possession of illegal drugs," id. at 92 n.
4, 100 S.Ct. at 343 n. 4, the Court concluded that
probable cause did not exist under the supporting
affidavit in that case to search all persons present.
The Court emphasized:
There is no reason to suppose that, when the
search warrant was issued on March 1, 1976, the
authorities had probable cause to believe that any
person found on the premises of the Aurora Tap
Tavern, aside from "Greg," would be violating
the law. The search warrant complaint did not
allege that the bar was frequented by persons
illegally purchasing drugs. It did not state that the
informant had ever seen a patron of the tavern
purchase drugs from "Greg" or from any other
person. Nowhere, in fact, did the complaint even
mention the patrons of the Aurora Tap Tavern.
Id. at 90, 100 S.Ct. at 341-42 (footnote omitted).
FN2. In its ruling on defendant's motion to suppress,
the trial court found that defendant was " 'present'
at the apartment."
Because defendant has not
properly challenged that finding on appeal, we
accept as fact that defendant was present at the
basement apartment for purposes of our analysis.
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KAY BRYSON
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 EAST CENTER, SUITE 2100
PROVO, UTAH 84601
PHONE: (801) 370-8026
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

vs.
STEVEN
ANGELA
255 N.
PROVO,

HUNDLEY
HUNDLEY
1600 W. #121
UT

:

SEARCH WARRANT

:

Criminal No.

Defendants
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
Magistrate's
^Indorsement

4*>

It has been established by oath or
affirmation made or submitted to me this
i day of November, 1994 that there is
probable cause to believe the following:
The property described below:
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed;
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of
an offense; or
is evidence of illegal conduct.
The property described below is most probably
located at the premises also set forth below.
The person or entity in possession of the property
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct.
That this warrant may be served without notice of
intent or authority to search, due to the fact that
the property to be searched for may be -easily
secreted, disposed of, or destroyed if notice of
intent to search is oiven.

5&

That this warrant may be served in the day time
hours.

NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to conduct
a search of the a residence described as a single-wide mobile home
located at 255 N. 1600 W. , Provo, Utah. The mobile home is in the
south end of the mobile park located on a corner, that corner being
a south west corner. The mobile home is cream colored with brown
trim with the main entrance facing south. The numerals n 121" are
located on the east side and the south side of the mobile home.
Your are also hereby directed to search of any outbuildings,
curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any individuals present at
the time of the execution of this warrant.
You are directed to search for the presence
property: controlled
substances, together
paraphernalia, including items used or capable
the storage, use, production, or distribution
methamphetamine.

of the following
with
associated
of being used for
of marijuana and

IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with
a written inventory of any property seized identifying the place
where the property is being held.

THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE
OF ISSUANCE.
DATED this

)

day of November, 1994, £_^fjZ,

MAGISTRATE

^

M.

KAY BRYSON
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100
PROVO, UTAH
PHONE:

(801)

370-8026
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
A SEARCH WARRANT

Plaintiff,
r>*

-vs-

Criminal No.

^CfiSSNjniKnT.KY
ANGELA HUNDLEY
2*55 H. l S U t r - W v - # 1 2 1
PROVO, UT

Defendants
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

:ss.
)

Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes
and states as follows:
j . I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have
been a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. During
the time I have been a peace officer I have received over 225 hours
of specialized training for law enforcement work including 185
hours of training specific to narcotics work. Narcotics classes I
have taken include training in surveillance, operation of
surveillance and electronic investigatory equipment, field testing
of drugs and drug recognition. As an officer I have participated
in hundreds of operations involving the undercover purchase of
narcotics and/or the arrest of person for substance abuse related
violations. I have experience working undercover providing first
hand experience with narcotics trafficking.
I have supervised
narcotics investigations for the Provo Police Department since
1992.
I
am
currently
designated
as
the
department
trainer/specialist in the areas of fingerprinting, surveillance,
video equipment, narcotics and drug recognition.

2.
On Sept. 21, 1994 Lt. Dave Bolda of the Provo City Police
Department received an anonymous phone call that Defendants are
using and selling cocaine.
The caller indicated Defendants'
address as being 255 N. 1600 W. #121, Provo, Utah, Utah County.
The anonymous caller also indicated that Defendant Steven Hundley
is dealing heavily at his place of employment, that being Mountain
States Steel.
3.
That during the month of October, 1994 Officer Jensen of
the Provo City Police Department received information from a
Confidential Informant that Defendant Steven Hundley is selling
cocaine.
4.
Your affiant believes the Confidential Informant who
spoke to Officer Jensen to be reliable in that the Confidential
Informant has supplied law enforcement with information in the past
that has proven reliable.
5.
Provo City has a solid waste collection system. Each
home is assigned a specific can which is owned by the City. An
additional can may be obtained for an additional fee. Once per
week, the cans are to be placed at curbside or in the street for
collection. A City truck then mechanically picks up and empties
the can.
6.
That on Nov. 7, 1994 in the early morning hours, your
affiant and other officers responded to the residence located at
255 N. 1600 W. #121 in Provo. There was one can placed in the
street for collection at that location with the numeral M 121 n
stencilled on the side. Your affiant took the can to the Provo
Police Department where the contents were reviewed. After your
affiant finished, the remaining contents were placed in the can and
the can returned to the street in front of the residence at 2 55 N.
1600 W. #121.
7.
Within the can, officers found paraphernalia associated
with the ingestion of methamphetamine. A chemical reagent test was
used on a piece of paraphernalia, that being a piece of charred
glass, which showed positive for methamphetamine. Also found in
the garbage were marijuana stems and leaf fragments. A chemical
reagent test was used on a leaf fragment which showed positive for
marijuana.
Other parts of paraphernalia found were syringes,
baggies, and butane fuel canisters. Also found in the garbage was
correspondence listing the address 255 N. 1600 W. #121 and also
listing the names Steven Hundley and Angie Hundley.

8.
The amounts of residue and marijuana in the garbage
imply small amounts for use.
Such amounts of marijuana and
methamphetamine are typically packaged in baggies of 1/8 oz. or
less for marijuana, and one gram bindles for methamphetamine, quite
small in volume. Such baggies and bindles can quickly and easily
be hidden in the clothing or be destroyed if intent is given to
search.
Moreover, it is your affiant's experience that persons
with a potentially violent disposition may react with violence if
confronted
with
a search.
One of the side effects of
methamphetamine use is an increase in violent behavior.
Entry
without notice allows officers to secure the residence and secure
officer safety.
9.
Marijuana, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia are often
kept in outlying vehicles and buildings.
Failure to search the
curtilage of the residence, together with the person of individuals
present, and vehicles located on the curtilage at the time of the
execution of the search, will likely result in officers missing
important evidence.
10. It is your affiant's experience that most of the people
I
have
encountered
with
the
unlawful
use
of
marijuana/methamphetamine also .occasionally sell, sometimes paying
for their use with profits from sales. It is so common as to be
the rule rather than the exception, to find evidence related to
production and/or distribution when controlled substances are
located in a residence.
11. The residence is more particularly described as a singlewide mobile home located at 255 N. 1600 W. . Provo, Utah.
The
mobile home is in the south end of the mobile park located ;;n a
corner, that corner being a south west corner. The mobile home is
cream colored with brown trim with the main entrance facing south.
The numerals ,f121n are located on the east side and the south side
of the mobile home.
12. Your affiant expects to locate additional controlled
substances
in
the
residence,
together
with
associated
parapherndlia, including items used or capable of being used for
the storage, u«=e, production, or distribution of marijuana a^d
methamphetamine.

Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by
this court authorizing the search of the mobile home, together with
the curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at
the time of search for presence of controlled substances together
with associated paraphernalia including items used or capable of
being used for the storage, use, production or distribution of
controlled substances to be executed without notice of intent or
authority in the daytime.
Dated this

q&

day of Ooteobcr- 1994

f\. M.

4£s04J
per
ial Investigations

Subscribed and sworn before me on the _

him^^vJI^-^

1994;

?••?*'

^?v^

day of

/r .M.
MAGISTRATE
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